When President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' party-PT) took office in Brazil in January 2003, the event signaled for many not only a shift in political style and economic and social policy objectives but also the rise of a new type of political elite likely to favor an adjustment in state-society relations and an improvement of the institutional framework for governance in response to an economic logic focused on boosting growth and employment. Early decisions of the Lula government such as the creation of the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Council for Economic and Social Development-CDES) in February 2003 appeared to confirm expectations of a change in policy style and content. Clearly, the PT government intended to give civil society, especially business, broader access to and participation in the policy-making process. What remained unclear was whether these attempts to involve societal actors in dialogue with the state implied a long-term shift in state-society relations in Brazil.
This article considers two key questions. First, to what extent do the political and economic elites in Latin America either drive forward or impede democratization? Second, assuming that a dialogue between political and economic elites is crucial to fostering positive political and economic outcomes, why and to what extent can mechanisms that encourage such dialogue enhance the outcomes of the democratization and development processes? Put another way, this article examines how the Lula government is handling what the World Bank calls the "corporate-public governance nexus" (Kaufmann, 2003) , and it argues that this connection is of crucial significance for understanding the Doctor / LULA'S DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL 133 CDES, (2) its composition, functions, and objectives, looking at process and substance, and (3) its contribution to policy reform and democratic governance in the first two years of its existence. Given the novelty and experimental nature of the CDES, the analysis must be tentative rather than conclusive. 3 
CREATION OF THE CDES THEORETICAL BASIS AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Space constraints preclude any in-depth analysis of theories of business-state relations and of corporatism or even of the nature of corporatism in Brazil. However, some brief comments on both are desirable. First, policy formulation and implementation are collective activities that occur within a given institutional context. In any capitalist system some form of institutionalized relations must be established among capital, labor, and the state. Since this article is concerned with the coordinated/corporatist pole of the "varieties of capitalism" spectrum (Hall and Soskice, 2001) , other types of systems are not discussed. In a purely corporatist system, people are represented on the basis of their occupations or economic roles rather than some other criterion such as geography. Moreover, the state grants or acknowledges a monopoly of representation to designated corporatist bodies, and voluntary associations have much less opportunity to influence the formulation and implementation of policy (see Schmitter, 1974) .
The authoritarian forms of corporatism imposed in many countries in the first half of the twentieth century were discredited and discarded in postwar Europe, although the governance benefits associated with close cooperation between state and economic interest groups were too valuable to be abandoned completely. Therefore, a new type of "societal" corporatism was born that on the one hand emphasized voluntary coordination among capital, labor, and the state but on the other keenly sought to establish a centralized and concentrated system of interest groups (Katzenstein, 1985) . This modern form of societal corporatism or "neo-corporatism" became most closely associated with the smaller European states, including Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, although neo-corporatist features were also evident in Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, and elsewhere. Wilson (2003: 102) provides a useful definition of neo-corporatism as "a form of governance in which organizations representing major economic interests, usually unions and employer's organizations, are given major, privileged opportunities to participate in policymaking in return for accepting responsibilities to assist the state in the governance of society. . . . This combination of sharing representation and governance is at the core of corporatism." Schneider (2004) notes that scholars credit neo-corporatism with superior macroeconomic management and sectoral governance (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001 ), improved quality of democracy (Katzenstein, 1985) involving a larger number of citizens and groups from civil society, and better opportunities for continuous and disaggregated intermediation of interests (Schmitter, 1995) . The corporatist literature also takes a more benign view of the role of the state in organizing civil society, 4 although it is seldom explicit about how the state should go about doing so. In other words, it tends 134 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES to take a static structural view rather than a dynamic one of changing economic contexts.
This static view is at odds with the emergence of neo-corporatism, which often arises in the context of political and/or economic change, as it did in postwar Europe. Initial neo-corporatist impulses must subsequently be institutionalized, either formally or informally, to have an ongoing impact on policy. As Richardson (1996) notes, this implies a shift to solving problems via "integrated bargaining" as opposed to "distributive bargaining"; it contemplates a scenario in which mutual gains are a possibility as opposed to a zero-sum interpretation of negotiated outcomes. The bargains "do not imply a consensus on values or on outcomes-but [at a minimum they do] imply a consensus that collaboration will produce efficiency gains all around" (Richardson, 1996: 13) . Given the high degree of uncertainty that political elites face in the policymaking arena, they often choose to encourage consensus building (even co-optation) and bargaining to resolve policy dilemmas. Neo-corporatism emphasizes the value of structured, long-term relationships in tripartite negotiations over adjustments to global and national economic processes and the interdependence of the state and societal actors in policy formulation and enforcement (McNamara, 1996) . Moreover, since neoliberal policies such as trade liberalization and deregulation require level playing fields and open competition, a neo-corporatist approach is more likely to produce such conditions than special pleading by individual firms (Crouch and Menon, 1995) . Finally, it is worth noting that neo-corporatism is often seen as an effective institutional vehicle for democratic consolidation and governance (Durand and Silva, 1998) . This is because it creates a procedural logic in policy making that encourages the development of a consensual style and helps establish lasting relationships that facilitate the interaction of political and economic elites.
The above features of neo-corporatism-structured tripartite negotiations for policy formulation and implementation, transparent, non-rent-seeking relations focused on increasing national competitiveness, and institutionalized democratic participation focused on enhancing governance-made it an attractive option for President Lula's government in Brazil. Moreover, historical institutionalists would argue, quite correctly, that one's starting point limits and determines the routes (choices) available. Thus, the idea of the evolution of Brazilian state corporatist institutions along the road to a more society-inclusive neo-corporatism does not seem far-fetched.
It is not innovative to claim that corporatism has essentially defined statesociety relations in Brazil ever since the 1930s. Scholars such as Schmitter (1971) , Mericle (1977) , Collier and Collier (1977) , Diniz and Boschi (1991) , Schneider (2004) , Kingstone (1999 ), Weyland (1996 , and Power and Doctor (2004) agree that its fragmented, often clientelistic sectoral corporatism limits group vision and reduces interaction with state actors to the pursuit of narrow, short-term objectives. Moreover, it is still too early to ascribe all the features of a more "democratic" corporatism to Brazil (Katzenstein, 1985) . Although there were some adjustments at the margin as a result of the democratization process of the 1980s and the structural reforms of the 1990s, inertial elements in Brazilian state corporatism obstructed change. For example, the benefits of corporatism privileged entrenched networks of vested interests, the fragmentation of business and labor organization destroyed the capacity to mobilize collective action, and the institutionalization of corporatism inhibited change, embedding it in the legal framework, formal structure, and informal practices of the state's relations with civil society (Power and Doctor, 2004) .
A more innovative analysis might suggest, however, that growing economic pressures and Lula's political credentials as union leader could produce an authentic revision of corporatist legislation, 5 even where more liberal-minded reformist presidents such as Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso had failed. However, in typical Brazilian style, whereby change occurs via sedimentation rather than metamorphosis (Schmitter, 1971) , modifications to corporatism are likely to be incremental, seeking to overlie rather than replace old corporatist institutions (Power and Doctor, 2004) . Moreover, policy makers' strong inclination toward pragmatic (i.e., nonideological) approaches to policy reforms (Pinheiro, Bonelli, and Schneider, 2004) colors their preferences to favor a nonconfrontational or consensus-based policy style. Moreover, this is exactly where Lula's CDES fits in.
The CDES did not erase past traditions of state-society relations but built on what was already a multipolar hybrid system of interest representation in which corporatist and pluralist associations worked together, clientelistic practices survived alongside open lobbying, and sector-oriented tripartite negotiations took place alongside the particularistic access of large firms to high-level bureaucrats and members of the government. Moreover, it fit in with the latest approaches to improving governance, encouraging democratic participation, enhancing transparency, reducing corruption, and avoiding the capture of the state by special interests even as it built on existing practices of state-society interaction and tackled issues raised by the considerable influence of the private sector on public policy and governance. It was precisely because of the above mix of conditions that the CDES presented an occasion for analytically connecting neo-corporatism and good governance. Interestingly, it also reintroduced a more proactive state, willing to innovate to improve political and economic results rather than embedding the CDES in the discredited structures of corporatism. Thus, the body provided economic and political elites with an opportunity to work alongside each other while implementing reforms and developing good governance practice via collective action with the support and participation of society as a whole. 6 The CDES was not the first attempt at modernizing Brazilian corporatism. The retreat of the state from productive activities and the liberalization of the 1990s saw some innovation in state-civil society relations and attempts to modernize corporatist structures and practices. For example, in the early 1990s Brazil experimented with a sectoral or meso-corporatist structure known as the Câmara Setorial (sectoral chamber). The Câmara Setorial was an instrument for tripartite consultation and negotiation over policy making (Arbix, 1996; Doctor, 2007) , and served as the first tripartite mechanism developed in Latin America that gave labor a genuine voice in a dialogue involving economic and political elites. Although the sectoral chambers failed to endure in the context of liberal economic reforms that discredited vertical/industrial policy, their successes were not forgotten, least of all by the representatives of labor. It is hard to imagine that President Lula and the PT ignored the positive contributions and lessons of the sectoral chambers when they designed the CDES. However, they adjusted the sectoral chamber's scope, moving away 136 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES from its sector-based or meso-corporatist (possibly rent-seeking) logic to foster a wider macro-level negotiation between state and society. In many ways, the CDES can be seen as the evolution of the meso-corporatist sectoral chamber into a full-fledged neo-corporatist institution including a tripartite macro-level bargaining mechanism.
Thus, rather surprisingly, one might consider the societal variant of corporatism, with its emphasis on "corporatist concertation" (Lembruch and Schmitter, 1982) , quite appropriate in the context of the growing interdependence between state and private-sector interests in the wake of political and economic liberalization. It could even result in the institutionalization of neocorporatism as a means of interest intermediation and policy implementation.
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
The terms of reference of the CDES, published by the Office of the President in early 2003, made clear that the government not only was aware of the existence of similar bodies elsewhere (about 30 countries have them) but consciously based the structure and objectives of CDES on these international experiences. Four cases in particular provided inspiration for Lula and the PT in setting up the CDES. The first postwar neo-corporatist development council was set up in France in 1948, but the Brazilian government was more inspired by its ideals and goals than by the concrete mechanisms that the French adopted. Thus, the French council differed from the Brazilian one in five key respects: (1) it was much larger (the French council has 231 members, while the Brazilian had 82); (2) its members had five-year terms (much longer than the two years in Brazil) and not all of them were appointed by the government as in Brazil; (3) it met more regularly (twice a month in France but only every other month in Brazil); (4) it worked alongside the French legislature and presented its reports to this body rather than to the executive as was the case in Brazil; and (5) it was obliged to publish its comments on the government's budget and produced some 20 reports a year, including recommendations that the government had to take into consideration when making policy (the Brazilian government did not guarantee to follow up the CDES's recommendations, nor was the CDES expected to comment on the budget).
Instead, official sources (http://www.presidencia.gov.br/cdes) acknowledged that the Brazilian model better reflected and drew upon the ideals and operational features of the long-standing Dutch council. Moreover, the Spanish and Portuguese equivalents (both set up in 1991) also contributed to the government's design of the CDES. Brazil took particular inspiration from these three cases for different reasons: the Dutch council's long history of successful dialogue between state and civil society drew the attention of PT leaders, while the Spanish and Portuguese councils merited attention because the Iberian countries had historical backgrounds and politico-economic processes (especially recent democratization) similar to those of Brazil.
The Dutch council, the Sociaal-Economische Raad, set up in 1950, was relatively small (33 members, with equal representation for business, labor, and the crown 7 ), worked very efficiently, and was considered influential and effective. In addition to its consultative and advisory functions, it supervised the work of 40 commodity and industrial boards (similar to the sectoral chambers in Brazil) and monitored the implementation of specific laws and regulations. It was viewed as a vital contributor to the success of the Dutch welfare state and the neo-corporatist model. Although the Brazilian CDES did not have its supervisory functions, it emulated it in two key ways: it also performed important advisory functions and reported directly to the executive (and not the legislature) and was strongly committed to ensuring sustainable economic development, equitable income distribution, and national competitiveness. The Spanish and Portuguese experiences also provided insight to the architects of the Brazilian council, since these countries, like Brazil, had democratized relatively recently. Moreover, they were looking to develop their economies at a fast pace so as to catch up with their European partners and better respond to the challenge of economic liberalization and globalization.
In all four of the above-mentioned cases, governments used neo-corporatist structures to allow civil society to articulate its positions and to communicate with government so as to influence policy outputs (decisions) and policy outcomes (results). They illustrated the value of the neo-corporatist characteristics of dialogue, transparency, and voice during processes of economic reform and integration into global markets. The European neo-corporatist experience showed that the involvement of economic elites and other key members of civil society, especially labor, in the policy formulation process not only served to include society's concerns and fine-tune policies accordingly but also smoothed the implementation process because of society's greater understanding of and identification with the goals of policy reforms and innovations. Both of these aspects of neo-corporatism were likely to be crucial considerations for any government with a broad reformist agenda that was forced to govern in a political context defined by the lack of a majority in the legislature and by the need to appease coalition partners that might not share the goals of the executive's policy reform wish-list.
To summarize, Lula's government consciously tried to create a mechanism that gave a greater voice to civil society in the hope of replicating Europe's positive experience with neo-corporatist structures. Additionally, the government also intended to build on Brazil's own corporatist traditions and institutions, updating and adapting them to make them more capable of responding to the demands of democratization, economic liberalization, and globalization.
STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CDES
Given the absence of evolved policy communities but an abundance of groups and corporatist institutions, the government decided that creating a body such as the CDES would be a way of channeling the ideas, interests, and knowledge of society to policy makers. Lula and the PT were well aware of the tensions arising from the two contradictory trends in modern policy making identified by Heclo (1977) : on the one hand, the need for more technocratic specialization to address the complexity inherent in modern policy making and, on the other, the need for a response to demands for broader civil society participation in public policy (Heclo, 1978; Mazey and Richardson, 1996) . Faced with this dilemma, a neo-corporatist body presented itself as a viable venue for such consultation.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
According to neo-corporatist theory, an institution such as the CDES ideally should have representation from a cross section of civil society and perform the following three functions: create opportunities for dialogue between public authorities and society, build consensus in support of the government's policy/reform agenda, and consolidate institutions that enhance democratic governance. In practical terms, each of these functions may be analyzed in terms of process and substance. In other words, any evaluation of the CDES should consider not only whether it was engaged in the appropriate process (for example, developing a dialogue and building consensus between the government and civil society) but also whether the substantive outcomes of this process positively contributed to its objectives (for example, supporting the implementation of reforms that enhance development and democracy). This section examines how the CDES's structure and operation (procedural aspects) contributed to achieving its objectives, while the next section evaluates the extent to which it managed to achieve those objectives (substantive aspects).
One of the most interesting and unexpected features of the CDES was its structure and composition. It was without precedent in Latin America. On February 13, 2003, at its inauguration, the president emphasized its "special character" and "new and precise objectives" as an instrument for constructing a "social pact" or consensus around the PT's reform agenda. To quote President Lula:
Nobody in this Council was chosen because they were friends of Lula or the PT. This Council is not a club of friends . . . or just another debating society. It is a very special space with new and precise objectives. It gathers together citizens, representing different social classes, various productive sectors with different points of view and interests that do not necessarily coincide, but with one common objective-to create conditions for Brazil to undertake the necessary reforms, overcome the current crisis, and reembark on a path of economic growth and genuine social justice in a sustainable manner. 8 The CDES's terms of reference determined its composition. Its 82 members, which included the President of the Republic and 10 representatives of the government, were representative of the country's social class, sectoral, and geographical diversity. However, instead of a roughly equal tripartite distribution of membership (as in the Dutch case) the PT decided to give business representatives 41 seats or 50 percent of the votes. Labor unions got 13 seats or 16 percent of votes; social organizations and independent "personalities" got 11 and 10 seats respectively or about 13 percent of the vote each, and other groups (religious, academic, and cultural) got 6 seats or 8 percent of the votes. The council was subsequently expanded to 91 (of whom only 7 were women). Members were appointed by the government and formally installed by the president for a (renewable) two-year period (there was no mechanism for self-nomination by societal actors). The first renewal in February 2005 saw 79 members retaining their seats, while those who had lost interest or were otherwise unable to serve were dropped from the council.
As Schneider (2004: 127) points out, it is revealing that while 15 of the original 41 business representatives came from existing associations or federations, the government appeared to favor individual businessmen over presidents of associations and, among associations, voluntary over corporatist ones. However, all the labor representatives came from the union confederations. He concludes that "CDES sent a clear signal that the government wanted input from prominent individual businessmen as much as or more than it wanted to listen to the collective, albeit distorted, voices of associations."
The government believed that overrepresentation of business was crucial for the improvement of economic and investment conditions and the generation of support for public policy decisions. It consciously tried to tap into a wide variety of views, for example, choosing labor union representatives on the basis of known differences in their positions on labor reform, especially the flexibilization of the Consolidation of Labor Laws.
9 Moreover, it eschewed a classical tripartite corporatist structure to allow a voice for unorganized sectors through the efforts of other representatives of civil society such as the Church.
The CDES was an independent body within the overall structure of government. It was not subordinate to any ministry, although it worked in conjunction with various political ministries, such as the Ministry of Political Coordination, contributing its views on the government's reform agenda. A special secretariat directly subordinate to the Office of the President coordinated the council's work, and it was allocated its own budget, resources, and staff to help present the results of its deliberations. Meetings were open to top government officials as well as nonmember participants invited for example, to clarify technical issues. Interestingly, political elites-whether political parties or state governors-tended to ignore the council. Was it because they considered it ineffective or perhaps irrelevant to their areas of action?
The CDES was charged with generating proposals on key reforms under consideration. In its first 18 months these included tax, social security, and labor law reforms, all part of the PT's core reform agenda (Schneider, 2004) . It also occasionally pronounced on the direction of economic policy and made suggestions regarding measures for boosting growth and development. It presented the results of its deliberations in the form of recommendations, which required a simple majority. Depending on voting outcomes, these recommendations were designated either as majority or as consensual positions. Again, it was clear that the government was concerned with getting more than the substance of policy right. It saw longer-term benefits (in terms of dialogue and democratic governance) from engaging in a process of consultation that was not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Thus, one could view the CDES as not only the locus where streams of problems, policies, and politics converged into a "primeval soup" (Kingdon, 1984) but also the source of viable proposals ready to be processed whenever a policy window appeared (Richardson, 1996) . 10 The main functions allocated to the CDES emerged from what can be seen as an effort to fit the PT's redistributive and participatory priorities into a more manageable format at the national level. Numerous scholars have described how historically the PT, when in local or state government, saw citizen participation and mechanisms for creating social consensus as a crucial means of overcoming its minority status in subnational legislative bodies or as a means of mediating between its organized base and the population it governed (Hochstetler, 2004) . Clearly, widespread citizen participation was a less feasible option at the national level, making a neo-corporatist solution attractive. In some sense, then, the PT government created the CDES to negotiate with a variety of social actors and to incorporate their inputs into the formulation of reform policies with the aim of creating civil society "ownership" of these policies. Thus, the council's prime functions were to create an open environment for discussing national issues, deepen the dialogue between public authorities and society, orient and support the government's policy agenda, negotiate trade-offs and present solutions after consulting various societal interests, and consolidate democratic governance.
According to its terms of reference, the CDES proposed specific policies in an advisory capacity and coordinated actions on relevant issues to remove administrative, legal, and financial obstacles to the economic and social development of the country. As has already been mentioned, most of its work focused on government reform proposals on the legislative agenda. It also discussed a range of issues related to economic policy, including interest rates, exchange rates, Central Bank autonomy, bank credit and long-term financing, bankruptcy legislation, industrial policy, innovation and technology policy, recovery of domestic demand, the revival of sectoral chambers, and employment and job creation. The government submitted its policy proposals to the CDES with a view to receiving feedback on its policy intentions, although the council could also take up relevant issues at its own discretion. In its first year it produced five "Letters of Concertation" (http:/ /www.presidencia.gov.br/cdes) articulating the views and preferences of its members on a number of social, economic, and political issues. These documents placed great emphasis on the council's support for democracy and social inclusion and even laid out the economic and political basis for constructing a new "social contract" for Brazil.
11 In early August 2003, the CDES also prepared and presented the government with a list of 10 measures for reactivating the economy, thus fulfilling what Marilena Chauí (an academic and PT intellectual) saw as its implicit function-which was to help shape the reform agenda and support the government in its efforts to resist economic and political pressures from the financial markets and the media (Estado de São Paulo, August 7, 2003) .
Business leaders were particularly eager to use the CDES as an insider pressure group that aggregated civil society interests with the aim of "encountering lasting solutions to national problems" (Rinaldo Campos Soares, President of USIMINAS, a large steel company, and a member of the CDES, quoted in the Estado de São Paulo, February 13, 2003) . The government was willing to accept this interpretation of its role. Thus, Tarso Genro, the CDES's first executive/ special secretary, repeatedly emphasized the dialogue and pressure-group functions, noting that "if it fails to act as a pressure group, it loses its very purpose" (Primeira Leitura, July 29, 2003) . It was with this in mind that Genro encouraged representatives of the media to attend its open meetings. However, he also warned that it was "neither an organ for the formulation of economic policy nor one of opposition to the government" (Primeira Leitura, September 4, 2003) . The CDES clearly had to tread a fine line.
To summarize, the council embodied, in both its procedural and substantive aspects, some of the priority "themes" of the PT government-for example, increasing the involvement of civil society via social mobilization, giving a voice to marginalized sectors, combating authoritarianism, clientelism, and inequality, building an efficient, agile, and responsive state, and deepening democratic institutions and economic reform (Baiocchi, 2003) . However, it found it difficult to translate good intentions into positive actions that committed the government to implementing its recommendations. It did better than some expected in terms of developing its own procedures, putting forward its own substantive proposals on key issues (labor and business contributed their own proposals to the debate) on the policy reform agenda, and identifying areas of convergence between government and civil society. Interestingly, there were many more tensions among representatives of labor 12 than between labor and representatives of capital, who had found common ground in their demands to reactivate the economy and prioritize job creation and investment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the shape and functions of the CDES evolved even during the short period between its initial inclusion in the list of PT campaign promises and the point when the PT took up the reins of government. The PT's original proposal was to create a social-policy-oriented council that would work alongside the technical sectoral chambers with some mechanism for intersectoral administration of the implementation of reforms. However, the final version did away with this two-tier structure and the social and sectoral emphasis. The actual CDES focused on economic policy areas, and thematic groups within it were responsible for intersectoral dimensions of the reform agenda (it is in these subgroups, away from the spotlight, that genuine discussion of issues took place). The final shape of the council replaced the earlier emphasis on social inclusion with a greater emphasis on stimulating economic development. Thus, in terms of both process and substance, the version of the CDES that actually took hold was rather different from the government's stated original design. The overwhelming policy focus remained on economic issues.
At this point, a brief comment on the procedural aspects arising from the CDES's structure and functions might be useful. One of the key problems facing the body originated in its formal attributes. The CDES was almost totally dependent on the executive, which defined not only its structure and membership but also its agenda. Moreover, it was accountable to the president and obliged to report directly to him. Thus, its scope for autonomous action was extremely limited and its accountability to the public nonexistent. Civil society representatives within the CDES became increasingly frustrated over their inability to put forward their own views on a range of issues. Meanwhile, the government faced growing criticism because of its inability to come up with a definitive strategy for consolidating its social programs and guaranteeing that CDES proposals were incorporated into its reforms. Key participants felt that their contributions were not being given the status and appreciation that they deserved, while others simply failed to lend the institution the support necessary to perform its work. For example, some members consistently failed to show up or sent their substitutes to meetings. These structural and procedural weaknesses, unsurprisingly, impacted substantive outcomes and overall performance.
Thus, political and economic elites found it difficult to maintain their earlier enthusiasm for the innovative consultative body. Reports suggested that at its March 2004 meeting even President Lula appeared "less animated" and enthusiastic than at earlier meetings (Revista Update, April 2004) . Others noted that the CDES was inextricably linked to Lula. The value that many members accorded it was related to direct access to the president and therefore tended to be tied to the popularity of the president and government (Sergio Haddad, interview, February 2005) . Should we see these attitudes as an early sign that the neo-corporatism envisioned by the PT was unlikely to be institutionalized in any lasting way? Alternatively, were these simply growing pains complicated by the difficult economic and social conjuncture?
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CDES
Notwithstanding its modest goals, the council was expected to fail. This section analyzes the justification for such predictions and examines the council's weaknesses and failures and then considers some of its achievements in terms of both process and substance. It should be kept in mind that the CDES should be judged only against what it can fairly be expected to have achieved given its structure and the limited scope of its functions. Its creators never aimed to set up the CDES as a challenger to the legislature or as the single protagonist responsible for channeling state-civil society relations. Established sectoral, regional, and other organizations and interest groups functioned alongside it, with the council providing a complementary rather than an exclusive mechanism for engaging in a dialogue between government and society and helping to create a consensus for reform implementation. This became palpable when in August 2003, barely six months after its founding, a number of civil society organizations set up their own forum, the Coordinador de Movimentos Sociais (Coordination of Social Movements-CMS). Although it was not conceived of as in opposition to the CDES, its explicit aim was also to discuss the key reforms on the government's agenda. Although the CMS had a different logic of organization (it was a pressure group and not an advisory council), in many ways the two bodies' work overlapped.
Of much greater relevance was the initiative taken by a number of CDES members (mostly representatives of social movements or those with a more left-of-center political orientation) to form an internal grouping of some 20 members called the Conselhinho (little council) to discuss their views and articulate their positions for the full council's consideration. They hoped to emphasize the importance of social and environmental issues and stressed the option of sustainable development rather than accepting the overriding concern of a majority of the members with economic growth (Sergio Haddad, interview, February 2005) . Was this a good sign for the longevity of Lula's neo-corporatist experiment, or was it an indication of civil society dissatisfaction with the consultative process in the CDES? More ominous, was it an expression of their frustration with the slow pace of substantive achievements? In other words, were groups such as the Conselhinho or the CMS to be seen as complementary or as critical? The short answer is all of the above. A more detailed and balanced consideration of these questions reveals indications that, although many welcomed the creation of the CDES, they recognized that it could neither command legislative outcomes nor replace "the rich tapestry of interaction between state and civil society groups in Brazil" (Horacio Lafer Piva, interview and correspondence, July 2004) . Finally, it was not surprising that it was the social movements that sought to increase their influence within the CDES that organized to articulate a joint/unified position, since they were the group that felt most vulnerable in the face of the council's overwhelming emphasis on economic growth and employment.
Notwithstanding the above qualifications to the council's performance, it suffered from a number of weaknesses related to its formal structure and functioning: First, it exhibited a heavy bias in favor of the business sector. The asymmetry in the representation of civil society caused resentment on the part of underrepresented or disadvantaged members, especially labor unions and social movements. Therefore, the creation of the Conselhinho should be interpreted partly in this light. Second, the geographic distribution of its membership was severely biased in favor of the more developed South and Southeast, with 46 percent of the first batch of council members originating from the state of São Paulo alone. Moreover, the low representation of the North and Northeast undermined claims that it was an organ focused on social and economic development (Ayala, 2003) . Third, the large size and diverse composition of the council sometimes provoked a clash of personalities incompatible with constructive contributions to the reform process. The CDES worked hard to create consensus. Horacio Lafer Piva, a key participant in the council, noted that the group performed much more effectively when broad issues were under consideration than when discussing the details of any proposal (interview, July 2004) . Fourth, the varying levels of member dedication and infrequent meetings not only limited the opportunities for active influence on the formulation of government policy but also confined the debate to the specific issues on the table rather than generating an ongoing evaluation of the policy environment.
Fifth, it was difficult to overlook the CDES's high degree of dependence on the executive and its almost complete lack of autonomy. Thus, some council members were growing increasingly frustrated with their limited room for influencing policy as well as the government's lack of commitment to implementing their decisions. Many of the dissatisfied chose to not renew their commitment after their initial two-year period expired. The executive was not obliged to give earnest consideration to the council's recommendations, and critics pointed out that the government used CDES proposals as a basis for policy making only if these were found to be in accord with its position.
Sixth, the aforementioned problem was exacerbated by the government's minority status in the Congress, an institution jealous of its exclusive legislative decision-making powers and unwilling to accommodate recommendations coming from a body constituted by and subordinate to the executive. Legislators were quick to complain about the CDES, and council members were more than aware of the perfunctory treatment Congress gave their recommendations. 13 Legislators were disgruntled because the CDES was given deliberative functions that in their opinion ran parallel to the work of Congress. However, it must be emphasized that constitutionally Congress retained all power with regard to legislation, and the president reiterated this point in his inaugural address to the CDES. Thus, the only threat the CDES posed was as an alternative-albeit elite-forum for articulating the interests of society. Seventh and finally, the lack of interest among political elites (e.g., other political parties and state governors) in many ways hampered CDES activity in the short term but posed an even greater constraint on the chances of its longer-term survival. This may have been the most significant weakness, since a subsequent government might simply find no value in an institution that lacked support among political elites.
Although the CDES has yet to locate its niche in Brazilian politics, it is too early to dismiss its potential contribution to Brazilian democracy. It undoubtedly represents an evolution in the political landscape in terms of governance. Its achievements have included more procedural than substantive successes, but it is still too soon to write off its longer-term impact on economic and social policy achievements. First, establishing a permanent consultative organ that was part of the formal government structure was a step in the right direction, at least from the perspective of democratic consolidation and governance. Experience suggested that governance capacity could be augmented by giving a greater participatory voice to civil society and encouraging transparency and accountability. The council has provided a forum for the articulation of the interests of societal actors and formalized civil society's input into the policy process. For example, over time it has had substantive inputs into Lula's Education Development Plan (PDE) and the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). It has encouraged both transparency and compromise in the public sphere. Second, the two-way flow of information within the CDES has supported a democracy operating in a globalized world economy in which knowledge and quick responses to changing circumstances play a key role in competitive success. On the one hand, the government has consistently heard the expressed opinions and demands of society; on the other hand, civil society has had more access to policy-related information.
Third, the CDES can be used as a means of speeding up the reform process. Its support can be employed as a trump card in getting the legislature to vote for the government's policy preferences. By emphasizing the consensus behind and/or support for CDES recommendations, the government can stress civil society's prior approval of its policy reform proposals, thus putting pressure on Congress to give them legal substance. However, it is worth emphasizing that the CDES cannot override the constitutional system of checks and balances, and, as we have seen, the efficiency to date of the government's attempts at such strong-arm tactics has been minimal. In fact, Congress has not hesitated to override and modify reform bills even when they had the solid backing of public opinion and institutions like the CDES.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the council is a significant institutional innovation, favoring genuine greater societal participation in the policy formulation and implementation process-a rarity in the Latin American context. It was consciously based on similar international institutions and incorporated the lessons learned from their experience. Although adjusting neo-corporatist institutions to the Brazilian context, with its strong state corporatist overtones, will require time, perseverance may actually pay off, as is suggested by pathdependent or historical-institutionalist approaches to understanding institutional modernization. This is because neo-corporatist institutions such as the CDES are more likely to fit into the Brazilian political system than purely pluralist models of state-society relations (Doctor, 2003) .
Brazil's CDES has served to articulate the interests and preferences of political and economic elites, institutionalizing dialogue and a consensual style of politics and in the process enhancing support for policy reform, improving governance, and driving forward democratization. However, given the uncertainties of the domestic and international context within which the government operates, longer-term institutionalization of the CDES is far from guaranteed. It is too early to claim that the CDES will become embedded in the Brazilian political economy. It is difficult enough to predict the commitment of the PT government, not to mention that of any successor. Lula's reelection in 2006 certainly has extended its shelf life and given it a better chance to prove its worth to the nation. Whatever the longer-term outcome, the neo-corporatist experience has exposed a wide range of individuals and civil society organizations to the procedural aspects of making democracy work. The new council sworn in for the [2007] [2008] period saw a turnover of 46 percent, thus involving ever-larger numbers in this neo-corporatist experiment.
The analysis has shown the value of dialogue and consensus for building strong democratic institutions, good governance practices, and competitive economic systems. Although the last word has not yet been written on whether neo-corporatism has delivered better economic results in a globalized economy, there is some evidence that neo-corporatist countries such as the Netherlands and Ireland have had less industrial unrest and greater governability (Schmitter, cited in Wilson, 2003) while demonstrating a greater capacity to adapt to increased competition (Katzenstein, 1985) . In a country like Brazil, which was undergoing significant structural reform and institutional modernization in the context of massive social inequalities, neo-corporatism could foster cooperation and compromise and allow economic agents and governments to address problems in a constructive manner. As Wilson (2003: 115) has pointed out, "in an era of relatively free movement of capital and massive levels of trading on world financial markets, governments must conform to market expectations in their economic policies or pay a severe price for defying them. If this argument is correct, it suggests that neo-corporatist countries might be at an advantage in world markets." This advantage, of course, arises from the cooperation and compromise negotiable within neo-corporatist institutions. The analysis also has suggested that the Brazilian government was most comfortable with a neo-corporatist approach to policy reform. It recognized that while traditional state corporatism could be a bottleneck to democratic consolidation and economic modernization, neo-corporatism could be a feasible progressive alternative to purely market-oriented systems of economic governance.
To conclude, political and economic elites have worked hard to drive forward and improve the quality of democracy in Brazil. This is evident in the social concertation and integrated bargaining taking place within new institutional structures such as the CDES. All the same, the government's intentions with respect to the objectives and longevity of neo-corporatist institutions remain unclear. Thus, it seems appropriate to conclude on a speculative note. Although political elites may have upheld traditional state corporatist institutions in the past, the vast majority have begun to recognize that these institutions call into question the quality of democracy in Brazil. State corporatism also reduced the government's room for maneuver and increased the likelihood of jeopardizing the long-term effectiveness of its reform agenda. These considerations weighed heavily with Brazilian policy makers, given their predilection for economic growth and pragmatic results-based approaches to policy reform (Pinheiro, Bonelli, and Schneider, 2004) . Thus, the above analysis suggests that although a PT government is unlikely to undertake a complete overhaul of corporatist legislation and institutions, it is reasonable to expect that some elements of corporatism may be dismantled piecemeal with the aim of adjusting to and incorporating the emerging demands arising from economic liberalization and growing pressure to ameliorate social injustice. This implies greater ongoing societal input into policy making, perhaps via the institutionalization of neo-corporatism. Signs of the government's commitment to this type of body are evident from its eagerness to take up the presidency of the International Association of Economic and Social Councils for [2007] [2008] [2009] . It has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations to help implant similar bodies elsewhere in Latin America.
Alternatively, the government could take an instrumental view of neocorporatism in which the CDES was simply a temporary transitional body. In such a scenario, the government's strategy might be to shift initially in a neo-corporatist direction to get some sort of social pact in place (while avoiding the actual use of the term, which has strong negative connotations of crisis in Latin American countries). Thereafter it could even broaden its modernizing liberal reform agenda, though not necessarily in a neo-corporatist institutional context. This would imply a change in the nature of and means for societal co-optation into policy formulation and implementation but not a genuine lasting commitment to the institutionalization of neo-corporatism.
NOTES

